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Abstract
In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does
not depend on order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities.
In this paper, a simple non-cooperative game for three agents, based
on bilateral offers, is presented. The ordinal Shapley rule arises in
subgame perfect equilibrium as the agents have more time to reach an
agreement.
Keywords: ordinal bargaining, ordinal Shapley rule
1 Introduction
In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend
on order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. For two agents,
Shapley (1969) shows that no efficient rule, apart from the dictatorial one,
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satisfies ordinal invariance. However, this negative result does not hold any
more for more than two agents. Shubik (1982) first documents an efficient,
symmetric, and ordinal invariant rule for three agents. Even though there is
no reference on the origin of this rule in Shubik (1982), Pérez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2006, p. 297) attribute it to Shapley (1969). Furthermore, Roth
(1979, p. 72-73) mentions a three-agent ordinal bargaining rule proposed by
Shapley and Shubik in a 1974 working paper. Kıbrıs (2004a, 2004b) refers
to it as the Shapley-Shubik rule.
Kıbrıs (2004b) describes a class of three-agent problems which generate all
bargaining problems. On this class, the ordinal Shapley rule coincides with
the Egalitarian rule (Kalai, 1977) and the Kalai-Smorodinsky rule (Kalai and
Smorodinsky, 1975), and moreover it is the only symmetric member of a class
of ordinal monotone path rules. Kıbrıs (2004a) also shows that the ordinal
Shapley rule is deeply related to a family of solutions defined by Bennett
(1997) for the class of multilateral bargaining problems. Moreover, Kıbrıs
(2012) characterizes the ordinal Shapley rule using a weaker version of Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Nash, 1950). On the other hand, Samet
and Safra (2005) extend the ordinal Shapley rule for more than three agents
using constructions similar to O’Neill, Samet, Wiener and Winter (2004).
Safra and Samet (2004) provide yet another family of ordinal solutions.
Following a different approach, Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2006) use
the underlying physical environment generating the utility possibilities fron-
tier. This allows them to define an ordinal extension for the Shapley value
for an arbitrary number of agents. We will call this value the ordinal Shapley
value.
Finally, a mixed approach is given by Calvo and Peters (2005), who study
situations where there exist ordinal and cardinal agents.
The definitions of these values are normative. An alternative approach
is to propose non-cooperative games whose equilibria yield the desired val-
ues. This is the basis of the so-called Nash program, first suggested by Nash
(1953), and also related to the theory of implementation. Implementation in
2
general environments is addressed by Moore and Repullo (1988) and Mani-
quet (2003). See also Serrano (2005, 2008) for two recent surveys on the
Nash program.
A non-cooperative game yielding the ordinal Shapley value in subgame
perfect equilibria for three agents is presented in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2005). This non-cooperative game is based on a bidding mechanism by
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, 2002).
In this paper, we present a non-cooperative game whose unique subgame
perfect equilibrium payoff allocation approaches the ordinal Shapley rule as
the agents have more time to reach an agreement. As far as we know, no
other similar result has been found for a purely ordinal rule.
Informally, the idea of the non-cooperative game is as follows: First, two
of the agents decide a payoff allocation a la Rubinstein, i.e. by an alternating-
offer procedure, with no discount and with one round passing by each time
an offer is rejected. However, each time an offer is rejected, the third agent
has the choice to replace the agent that made the rejection. Once an offer (if
any) is agreed upon, it constitutes a pre-agreement between the two agents
who reached it. The other agent can then choose one of them and make her
a counter-proposal, which in case of being accepted would cancel the pre-
agreement. However, if the counter-proposal is rejected, the unchosen agent
makes a last offer with the pre-agreement remaining as a status quo in case of
rejection. Moreover, before either the counter-proposal or the pre-agreement
is implemented, the agent that did not participate in it has an option of
renegotiation, which makes the process to be repeated in the next round. If
no agreement is reached after a pre-specified number of rounds, the process
finishes with the status quo as the final payoff allocation.
As the number of rounds increases, there exists a subgame perfect equi-
librium whose payoff allocation approaches the ordinal Shapley rule. Under
reasonable assumptions on the behavior of the agents when they are indif-
ferent (tie-breaking rules), this equilibrium is unique.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the basic
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notation and definitions, as well as some preliminary results. In Section 3 we
formally describe the non-cooperative game and provide the main results, as
well as an overview of the proofs. We present the formal proofs in Section 4
(Appendix).
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of agents. Given x, y ∈ RN , x ≤ y means xi ≤ yi
for all i ∈ N , x≪ y means xi < yi for all i ∈ N , and x < y means x ≤ y and
x = y. Let Π be the set of all permutations of N , with generic element π.
A pair (S, d) ∈ 2N × RN is a bargaining problem if {x ∈ S : y ≤ x} is
compact for all y ∈ RN and d belongs to the interior of S. A point x ∈ S is
Pareto optimal in S if there is no y ∈ S such that x < y. Let P (S) denote
the set of Pareto optimal points in S. A point x ∈ S is weakly Pareto optimal
in S if there is no y ∈ S such that x ≪ y. Let WP (S) denote the set of
weakly Pareto optimal points in S.
A bargaining problem (S, d) is strictly comprehensive if WP (S) = P (S)
and for each x ∈ S, y ≤ x implies y ∈ S. Let B denote the set of all strictly
comprehensive bargaining problems.
For each (S, d) ∈ B, x, y ∈ RN and N = {i, j, k}, agent i’s aspiration
payoff restricted to xj and yk is
ai (S, 〈xj, yk〉) ≡ max {si : (si, xj , yk) ∈ S}
and her aspiration payoff allocation restricted to xj and yk is
a (S, 〈xj, yk〉) ≡ (ai (S, 〈xj, yk〉) , xj, yk) .
Let (S, d) ∈ B. Define p0 (S, d) ≡ d and p0,ij (S, d) ≡ a (S, 〈di, dj〉) for all
i, j ∈ N . For each t = 1, 2, ..., there exists a unique pt (S, d) ∈ RN such that
pt,12 (S, d) ≡
(
pt1 (S, d) , p
t
2 (S, d) , p
t−1
3 (S, d)
)
∈ P (S)
pt,13 (S, d) ≡
(
pt1 (S, d) , p
t−1
2 (S, d) , p
t
3 (S, d)
)
∈ P (S)
pt,23 (S, d) ≡
(
pt−11 (S, d) , p
t
2 (S, d) , p
t
3 (S, d)
)
∈ P (S) .
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For simplicity, we write pt,ij instead of pt,ij (S, d). For notational conve-
nience, pt,12 = pt,21 and so on.
It is easily checked (see Figure 1) that, given {i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3} and
t > 0,
pt−1,iji = p
t−1,ik
i = p
t,jk
i . (1)
Let pt−1,·ii ≡ p
t−1,ij
i = p
t−1,ik
i . We also have
pt−1,·ii < p
t−1,jk
i if t is odd
pt−1,·ii > p
t−1,jk
i if t is even
(2)
and
pt,·ii < p
t−1,jk
i if t is odd
pt,·ii > p
t−1,jk
i if t is even
(3)
and
pt−1,·ii < p
t,·i
i if t is odd
pt−1,·ii > p
t,·i
i if t is even.
(4)
Moreover, notice that,
pt−1,ij = a
(
S,
〈
pt−1,·ii , p
t−1,·j
j
〉)
. (5)
The sequence {pt}∞t=0 is uniquely defined and it is convergent. Also, for
each i, j ∈ N ,
lim
t→∞
pt = lim
t→∞
pt,ij.
A bargaining rule F : B → RN assigns to each bargaining problem (S, d) ∈
B a feasible point F (S, d) ∈ S. For each (S, d) ∈ B, the ordinal Shapley rule,
Sh : B → RN assigns the limit of the sequence {pt}∞t=0, namely:
Sh (S, d) ≡ lim
t→∞
pt.
This bargaining rule is Pareto optimal, symmetric and ordinal invariant.
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Figure 1: Position of the first points pt,ij. The points pt are at the vertices
(of the polyhedrons) that do not lie on the frontier of S.
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3 The non-cooperative game
We describe in detail the non-cooperative game depicted in the Introduction.
There are at most T negotiation rounds. If no agreement is reached
after round T , the disagreement payoff allocation d is implemented. At each
round, the agents play the roles of first proposer, first responder, and pivot.
Say, w.l.o.g., that, in the first round, agent 1 is the first proposer, agent 2
is the first responder, and agent 3 is the pivot. Agent 1 proposes a payoff
allocation x ∈ S. Agent 2 can then accept or reject this proposal.
A round passes by if agent 2 rejects this proposal. In this case, agent 3
can choose to replace agent 2, so that in the next round agent 1 keeps playing
the role of first proposer, whereas agent 3 becomes the first responder and
agent 2 becomes the pivot. In case agent 3 does not replace agent 2, then
agent 2 plays the role of first proposer and agent 1 plays the role of first
responder.
In case agent 2 accepts the proposal x, then agent 3 makes a counter-
proposal y ∈ S to either agent 1 or agent 2 (whoever agent 3 chooses). Let i
be this agent and let j be the other one. Agent i should choose between the
counter-proposal y and the pre-agreement x. Two cases are possible:
1. If agent i chooses y, then agent j can still ask for a renegotiation. If
agent j does not ask for a renegotiation, y is implemented and the game
finishes. If agent j ask for a renegotiation, a round passes by.
2. If agent i chooses x, then agent j makes a last proposal z ∈ S. Agent
i should choose between z and x. In case z is chosen and agent 3 does
not veto, this payoff allocation is implemented and the game finishes. If
agent 3 vetoes, the final payoff is d. In case x is chosen, agent 3 can still
ask for a renegotiation. If agent 3 does not ask for a renegotiation, x is
implemented and the game finishes. If agent 3 ask for a renegotiation,
a round passes by.
In case of renegotiation, in the next round agent 3 plays the role of first
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proposer, agent i plays the role of first responder, and agent j plays the role
of pivot.
At round T + 1, the game finishes and the final payoff allocation is d.
In order to fully formalize the non-cooperative game, a formal description
is presented as follows (see also Figure 2). We denote the game as Bt (π),
where t is the number of rounds left (hence, we begin with BT (π)) and π ∈ Π
is the order that specifies the roles: π1 is the first proposer, π2 is the first
responder, and π3 is the pivot. For simplicity, we write Bt [π1π2π3] instead
of the more cumbersome Bt ([π1π2π3]).
The non-cooperative game is defined inductively on t. B0 (π) is the trivial
game with d as final payoff allocation.
Assume Bs (σ) is defined for all s < t and all σ ∈ Π. Assume w.l.o.g.
that π = [123], i.e. πi = i for all i ∈ N . We define Bt [123] as follows:
Agent 1 proposes x ∈ S. Agent 2 can accept or reject.
If agent 2 rejects, agent 3 chooses between playing gameBt−1 [132]
or Bt−1 [213]. If agent 2 accepts, agent 3 chooses i ∈ {1, 2} and
proposes y ∈ S. Let j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i} be the other agent.
Agent i can choose x or y.
If agent i chooses y, then agent j can ask for a renegotiation. If
agent j ask for a renegotiation, then Bt−1 [3ij] is played. If agent
j does not ask for a renegotiation, y is implemented and the game
finishes.
If agent i chooses x, then agent j proposes z ∈ S. Agent i can
choose z or x. If agent i chooses z, then agent 3 can veto or not
veto. If agent 3 does not veto, z is implemented and the game
finishes. If agent 3 vetoes, d is implemented and the game finishes.
If agent i chooses x, then agent 3 can ask for a renegotiation. If
agent 3 does not ask for a renegotiation, x is implemented and the
game finishes. If agent 3 ask for a renegotiation, then Bt−1 [3ij]
is played.
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3i, y
i
Bt−1[3ij]
jj
i
y
z
z Bt−1[3ij]
3
x
xy
z x
1
x
2
rejectsaccepts
Bt−1[213]
3
d
3
Bt−1[132]
Figure 2: The non-cooperative game Bt [123] with t > 0.
Notice that, in each round, any agreement (x, y or z) should be first
achieved by two agents (x by agents 1 and 2, y by agents 3 and i, and z
by agents 1 and 2 again). Once two agents have agreed upon a proposal,
the third one has the choice to ask for a renegotiation and move to the next
round. The only exception is given by agent 3 when z is chosen. In this
case, agent 3 cannot ask for a renegotiation, but she can veto z and force the
implementation of d.
Theorem 3.1 For any T > 0 and π ∈ Π, there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium for the non-cooperative game BT (π) whose equilibrium payoff
allocation is pT,π1π3.
An immediate corollary is the following:
Corollary 3.1 As T increases, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in
the non-cooperative game whose final payoff allocation approaches the payoff
allocation given by the ordinal Shapley rule.
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In general, there can be more than one subgame perfect equilibrium. How-
ever, the above subgame perfect equilibrium is unique under the following
Assumptions:
Assumption 1 The agents strictly prefer to finish in the earliest round.
Assumption 2 If the pivot (say k) is indifferent when choosing i, and x is
such that k is bound to ask for renegotiating it, then k would choose
the most harmful choice for the first proposer.
Assumption 1 follows from the fact that either a rejection or a renego-
tiation implies a delay. Hence, it seems natural that an agent would prefer
to reach an agreement as soon as possible. Following this idea, Assumption
1 implies that, when an agent is due to receive the same final payoff when
accepting or rejecting x, or whether she ask or not for a renegotiation, then
she accepts and does not ask for a renegotiation. An equivalent assumption
is to assume that all the agents have a lexicographic preference for the game
ending in the first round. See Bag and Winter (1999, p. 79) for the intu-
ition behind this assumption, which is also used in Mutuswami and Winter
(2002). Other similar assumption is used in Moldovanu and Winter (1994),
who assume that an agent prefers agreements which involve larger rather
than smaller coalitions (provided her final payoff is the same in both agree-
ments). Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) also assumed that agents “break ties in
favor of quick termination of the game”1.
Assumption 2 is needed for T > 1 and it has the following justification:
since x comes from the first proposer, and it is not satisfactory for the pivot
(in the sense that she would prefer to ask for a renegotiation), the threat of
harming the first proposer is justifiable and hence credible. Moreover, the
payoff allocation would be strictly smaller for the pivot in subgame perfect
equilibria not satisfying Assumption 2. This latter idea is related with the
justification the proper equilibria (Myerson, 1978) as a refinement of the
1However, tie-breaking rules are not needed in Hart and Mas-Colell’s model.
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"trembling-hand" perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975). The proper equilibria
assumes that more costly mistakes are much less likely to happen.
Theorem 3.2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for any T > 0 and π ∈ Π,
pT,π1π3 is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocation for the
non-cooperative game BT [π].
An immediate corollary is the following:
Corollary 3.2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, as T increases the only equi-
librium payoff allocation in the non-cooperative game BT [π] approaches the
payoff allocation given by the ordinal Shapley rule.
The formal proofs of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 are located in the
Appendix. We provide here the idea. Assume π = [123]. Basically, there are
two cases to consider: x3 ≥ p
T,12
3 and x3 < p
T,12
3 .
In the first case (x3 ≥ p
T,12
3
(1)
= pT−1,·33 ), and under an induction hypothe-
sis, agent 3 is bound to accept x in case agent i chooses x twice. From this,
the optimal z for agent j is a (S, 〈xi, d3〉) and that would be the final payoff
allocation in the subgame that begins when agent j proposes z. Knowing
that, the optimal y for agent 3 would be a
(
S,
〈
xi, p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
and that would
be the final payoff allocation in the subgame that begins when agent 3 pro-
poses y. This implies that an optimal x for agent 1 satisfies x ∈ P (S),
x3 = p
T−1,·3
3 and a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
= a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
. These condi-
tions imply x = pT,12, which will make agent 2 indifferent between accepting
or rejecting. The final payoff allocation will then be
a
(
S,
〈
pT,121 , p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
(1)
= a
(
S,
〈
pT,·11 , p
T,13
2
〉)
(5)
= pT,13.
Assumption 1 is needed in order of agent 2 to accept x = pT,12, since there is
no possibility for agent 1 to find another x around pT,12 which breaks this in-
difference. Inducing agent 2 to reject would be also harmful for agent 1, since
agent 3 would choose the best (for her) between Bt−1 [132] and Bt−1 [213],
which will coincide with the worst for agent 1.
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In the second case (x3 < p
T,12
3
(1)
= pT−1,·33 ), agent 3 is bound to ask for a
renegotiation in case agent i chooses x twice. Under the induction hypothesis,
the final payoff would be pT−1,j3 when T > 1, and d when T = 1. From
this, the optimal z for agent j is a
(
S,
〈
pT−1,j3i , d3
〉)
when T > 1, and
a (S, 〈di, d3〉) = p
0,i3 when T = 1. That would be the final payoff in the
subgame that begins when agent j proposes z. Knowing that, the optimal
x for agent 3 would be a
(
S,
〈
pT−1,j3i , p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
(5)
= pT−1,j3 when T > 1, and
a
(
S,
〈
p0,·ii , p
0,·j
j
〉) (5)
= p0,ij when T > 1. That would be the final payoff in the
game that begins when agent 3 proposes x.
At this point, Assumption 2 is needed for T > 1 so that agent 3 makes
the most harmful choice of i for agent 1, so that it is not profitable for agent
1 to choose x with x3 < p
T,12
3 . If this happens, the final payoff for agent 3
would be strictly lower than pT,·33 , which gives an additional justification for
Assumption 2 to hold.
Notice that Assumption 2 is not needed for T = 1 because the final payoff
for player 1 would be d1 (irrespectively of the choice of i) and d1 < p
1,·1
1 .
As a result, the equilibrium path in these results is the following: Agent 1
proposes x = pT,12, agent 2 accepts, agent 3 chooses to negotiate with agent
1 and proposes y = pT,13, agent 1 chooses y, and agent 2 does not ask for a
renegotiation.
4 Appendix
In this section we formally prove Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2. We will use
the following lemmas:
Lemma 4.1 Let x ∈ S such that x3 ≥ p
t,12
3 for some t ≥ 0. Then,
max
{
a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
t,13
2
〉)
, a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
t,23
1
〉)}
≥ pt,123
and, moreover, equality holds iff x = pt,12.
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Proof. Define three functions f1, f2, f :
{
y ∈ S : y3 ≥ p
t,12
3
}
→ R as follows:
f 1 (y) = a3
(
S,
〈
y1, p
t,13
2
〉)
f 2 (y) = a3
(
S,
〈
y2, p
t,23
1
〉)
f (y) = max
{
f 1 (y) , f2 (y)
}
.
We will compute the minimum of f . Under our hypothesis on S, f 1 (y)
is strictly decreasing in y1, whereas f2 (y) is strictly decreasing in y2. Hence,
f reaches a minimum when y ∈ P (S), y3 = p
t,12
3 and f
1 (y) = f 2 (y), i.e.
y ∈ P (S)
y3 = p
t,12
3
a3
(
S,
〈
y1, p
t,13
2
〉)
= a3
(
S,
〈
y2, p
t,23
1
〉)
.
which has a unique solution: y = pt,12, so that f (pt,12) = pt,123 .
Lemma 4.2 Given t > 0,
max
{
x1 : x ∈ S, a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
t−1,·2
2
〉)
≥ a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
t−1,·1
1
〉)
, x3 ≥ p
t−1,·3
3
}
= pt,·11
and, moreover, this maximum is only achieved when x = pt,12.
Proof. Let x ∈ S such that a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
t−1,·2
2
〉)
≥ a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
t−1,·1
1
〉)
and
x3 ≥ p
t−1,·3
3 .
Assume first x /∈ P (S). Under the strict comprehensiveness of S, we
can find some ǫ1, ǫ2 > 0 such that xǫ := (x1 + ǫ1, x2 + ǫ2, x3) ∈ S and
a3
(
S,
〈
xǫ1, p
t−1,·2
2
〉)
≥ a3
(
S,
〈
xǫ2, p
t−1,·1
1
〉)
. Hence, x ∈ P (S) is necessary to
achieve the supremum.
Assume now x ∈ P (S) and x3 > p
t−1,·3
3 . Under the strict comprehen-
siveness of S, we can find some ε1 > 0 such that xε :=
(
x1 + ε1, x2, p
t−1,·3
3
)
satisfies x ∈ S, xε3 ≥ p
t−1,·3
3 and a3
(
S,
〈
xε1, p
t−1,·2
2
〉)
≥ a3
(
S,
〈
xε2, p
t−1,·1
1
〉)
.
Hence, x3 = p
t−1,·3
3 is necessary to achieve the supremum.
Assume now x ∈ P (S), x3 = p
t−1,·3
3 and a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
t−1,·2
2
〉)
> a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
t−1,·1
1
〉)
.
Under the strict comprehensiveness of S, we can find some δ1, δ2 > 0 such
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that xδ := (x1 + δ1, x2 − δ2, x3) satisfies xδ ∈ S and a3
(
S,
〈
xδ1, p
t−1,·2
2
〉)
≥
a3
(
S,
〈
xδ2, p
t−1,·1
1
〉)
. Hence, a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
t−1,·2
2
〉)
= a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
t−1,·1
1
〉)
is neces-
sary to achieve the supremum.
Assume x ∈ P (S), x3 = p
t−1,·3
3 and a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
t−1,·2
2
〉)
= a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
t−1,·1
1
〉)
.
We have to prove that x = pt,12. Under (1), these conditions are equivalent
to
x ∈ P (S)
x3 = p
t,12
3
a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
t,13
2
〉)
= a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
t,23
1
〉)
.
which has a unique solution: x = pt,12.
We now prove Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2. For any t ≥ 0 and i, j ∈ N ,
i = j, let qt,ij ∈ RN be defined as q0,ij ≡ d and qt,ij ≡ pt,ij otherwise. We
will prove the following (stronger) result:
For any T ≥ 0 and π ∈ Π, there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium for the non-cooperative game BT (π) whose payoff
allocation is qT,π1π3 . Moreover, this subgame perfect equilibrium
payoff allocation is unique under Assumption 1 and Assumption
2.
Notice that, by definition, qt,kji = p
t,jk
i unless t = 0 and i /∈ {j, k}. Hence,
we write pt,jki instead of q
t,jk
i unless case q
0,jk
i with i /∈ {j, k} is possible.
Assume w.l.o.g. that, in the first round, agent 1 is the first proposer,
agent 2 is the first responder, and agent 3 is the pivot. The proof is by
induction on T . For T = 0, B0 ([123]) is a trivial game and the unique final
payoff allocation is d = q0,13.
Assume the result is true for less than T rounds, T > 0. The subgame
that arises in the second round of the game with T rounds is strategically
equivalent to the game with T − 1 rounds. Hence, the continuation payoff in
the second round is known by the agents. Under the induction hypothesis,
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qT−1,π1π3 is the continuation payoff in the second round when the order is
given by π ∈ Π.
We first prove that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium whose final
payoff allocation is pT,13.
Consider the following strategic profile in BT [123]:
• At the beginning of the round, agent 1 proposes x = pT,12.
• Agent 2 rejects x iff x3 ≥ p
T−1,·3
3 , a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
< a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
and x2 < p
T−1,·2
2 .
• If agent 2 rejects x , agent 3 choosesBT−1 [132] if T is odd andBT−1 [213]
if T is even.
• If agent 2 accepts x, agent 3 chooses i and proposes y following the
next rule:
— If x3 < p
T−1,·3
3 , she chooses i = 1 if T is even and i = 2 if T is odd,
and proposes y = pT−1,j3.
— If x3 ≥ p
T−1,·3
3 , she chooses i = 1 if a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
≥ a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
and i = 2 if a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
< a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
, and pro-
poses y = a
(
S,
〈
xi, p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
.
• After agent 3 chooses i and proposes y, agent i chooses either x or y
following the next rule:
— If x3 < p
T−1,·3
3 and yj < p
T−1,·j
j , she chooses x.
— If x3 < p
T−1,·3
3 and yj ≥ p
T−1,·j
j , she chooses x iff q
T−1,j3
i > yi.
— If x3 ≥ p
T−1,·3
3 and yj < p
T−1,·j
j , she chooses x iff xi > q
T−1,j3
i .
— If x3 ≥ p
T−1,·3
3 and yj ≥ p
T−1,·j
j , she chooses x iff xi > yi.
• If agent i chooses y, then agent j asks for renegotiation iff yj < p
T−1,·j
j .
• If agent i chooses x, then agent j proposes z following the next rule:
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— If x3 < p
T−1,·3
3 , she proposes z = a
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , d3
〉)
.
— If x3 ≥ p
T−1,·3
3 , she proposes z = a (S, 〈xi, d3〉).
• After agent j proposes z, agent i chooses either z or x following the
next rule:
— If z3 < d3 and x3 < p
T−1,·3
3 , she chooses z iff di ≥ q
T−1,j3
i .
— If z3 < d3 and x3 ≥ p
T−1,·3
3 , she chooses z iff di ≥ xi.
— If z3 ≥ d3 and x3 < p
T−1,·3
3 , she chooses z iff zi ≥ q
T−1,j3
i .
— If z3 ≥ d3 and x3 ≥ p
T−1,·3
3 , she chooses z iff zi ≥ xi.
• After agent i chooses z, agent 3 vetoes iff z3 < d3.
• After agent i chooses x, agent 3 asks for a renegotiation iff x3 < p
T−1,·3
3 .
In each BT−1 (σ), we apply the induction hypothesis and assume the
agents play a subgame perfect equilibrium profile that gives as final payoff
qT−1,σ1σ3 .
Under (1) and the induction hypothesis, a backward reasoning shows that
the above strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium after agent i
chooses y and after agent j proposes z.
To see that the proposed choice of z is optimal for agent j, we distinguish
two cases:
1. If x3 < p
T−1,·3
3 , then agent i can assure herself q
T−1,j3
i by choosing x.
Thus, the maximum that agent j can get by making an acceptable
offer is aj
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , d3
〉)
. This is what she would get by choosing
z = a
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , d3
〉)
, because it would induce agent i to choose z
and agent 3 not to veto.
2. If x3 ≥ p
T−1,·3
3 , then agent i can assure herself xi by choosing x. Thus,
the maximum that agent j can get is aj (S, 〈xi, d3〉). This is what she
gets by choosing z = a (S, 〈xi, d3〉), because it would induce agent i to
choose z and agent 3 not to veto.
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Hence, the final payoff allocation in this subgame (when agent j proposes
z) is given by a
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , d3
〉)
when x3 < p
T−1,·3
3 and by a (S, 〈xi, d3〉)
when x3 ≥ p
T−1,·3
3 .
Moreover, it is straightforward to check that, given y, the strategy of
agent i is optimal for her.
We now check that the proposed choice of i and y is optimal for agent
3. Notice that, in case agent i chooses x, the strategies imply that the final
payoff for agent 3 will be d3.
We have two cases:
1. If x3 < p
T−1,·3
3 , then y = p
T−1,j3 and the strategies determine that agent
i chooses y and agent j does not ask for a renegotiation, so that the final
payoff for agent 3 is y3 = p
T−1,·3
3 . Hence, for such an x, the choice of i
is indifferent. Moreover, this choice of y is optimal among those that
induce agent i to choose y and agent j not to ask for a renegotiation.
2. If x3 ≥ p
T−1,·3
3 , then y = a
(
S,
〈
xi, p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
and the strategies deter-
mine that agent i chooses y and agent j does not ask for a renegotiation,
so that the final payoff for agent 3 is y3 = a3
(
S,
〈
xi, p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
. Hence,
for this y, the choice of i is optimal, so that the final payoff for agent
3 is max
{
a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
, a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)}
. Moreover, this
choice of y is optimal among those that induce agent i to choose y
and agent j not to ask for a renegotiation. Under Lemma 4.1 and (1),
max
{
a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
, a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)}
≥ pT−1,·33 .
Hence, in both cases, agent 3 gets at least pT−1,·33 . There are two possible
deviations: To induce agent i to choose y and agent j to ask for a renego-
tiation, and to induce agent i to choose x. In the first case, the induction
hypothesis implies that the final payoff for agent 3 is pT−1,·33 , so she does not
improve. In the second case, the strategies imply that the final payoff for
agent 3 is d3, which is again not higher than p
T−1,·3
3 .
We now check that the proposed strategy for agent 3, after agent 2 rejects
x, is optimal. Under the induction hypothesis, the final payoff for agent 3
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is qT−1,123 if she chooses B
T−1 [132], and pT−1,·33 if she chooses B
T−1 [213]. If
T = 1, agent 3 is indifferent (she gets d3 in either case). If T > 1, under (2),
it is optimal to choose BT−1 [132] if T is odd and BT−1 [213] is T is even.
We now check that the proposed rule followed by agent 2 to reject x is
optimal. Under the induction hypothesis, the final payoff for agent 2 in case
of rejection is pT−1,·22 , irrespectively of T being odd or even. For the payoff
in case of acceptance, we have two cases:
1. If x3 < p
T−1,·3
3 , the final payoff for agent 2 in case of acceptance is
pT−1,·22 if T is even, p
T−1,13
2 if T is odd and T > 1, and d2 if T = 1.
Hence, agent 2 is indifferent when T is even or (since p0,·22 = d2) when
T = 1. Under (2), she is strictly better by accepting when T is odd
and T > 1.
2. If x3 ≥ p
T−1,·3
3 , we have two subcases:
(a) If a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
≥ a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
, the final payoff for
agent 2 is pT−1,·22 . Hence, agent 2 is indifferent between accepting
or rejecting. In particular, accepting is optimal.
(b) If a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
< a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
, the final payoff for
agent 2 is x2. Hence, it is optimal to reject iff x2 < p
T−1,·2
2 .
We now check that x = pT,12 is an optimal proposal for agent 1. If
she does not deviate, then agent 2 will accept, agent 3 will choose i = 1
and y = a
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
, agent i = 1 will choose y and agent j = 2
will not ask for a renegotiation, so that the final payoff for agent 1 will be
y1 = x1 = p
T,·1
1 .
Assume agent 1 deviates by proposing x with x3 < p
T,12
3
(1)
= pT−1,·33 . Then
her final payoff becomes pT−1,231 if T is even or p
T−1,·1
1 if T is odd. Under (3),
agent 1 is strictly worse off when T is even. Under (4), agent 1 is strictly
worse off when T is odd.
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Assume now agent 1 deviates by proposing x with x3 ≥ p
T,12
3
(1)
= pT−1,·33
and a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
< a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
. Under (1) and Lemma 4.1,
a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
> pT−1,·33 which implies x2 < p
T−1,13
2 .
We have two cases:
1. If x2 < p
T−1,·2
2 , then agent 2 rejects x. If T is odd, agent 3 chooses
BT−1 [132] and, under the induction hypothesis, the final payoff for
agent 1 will be pT−1,·11 . Under (4), p
T−1,·1
1 < p
T,·1
1 and agent 1 does
not improve. If T is even, agent 3 chooses BT−1 [213] and, under the
induction hypothesis, the final payoff for agent 1 will be pT−1,231 . Under
(3), pT−1,231 < p
T,·1
1 and agent 1 does not improve.
2. If x2 ≥ p
T−1,·2
2 , then the final payoff allocation is a
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
.
If T is odd, under (4), pT−1,·11 < p
T,·1
1 and agent 1 does not improve.
If T is even, under (2), pT−1,132 < p
T−1,·2
2 but this not possible because
x2 < p
T−1,13
2 and x2 ≥ p
T−1,·2
2 .
Assume now agent 1 deviates by proposing x = pT,12 with x3 ≥ p
T−1,·3
3
and a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
≥ a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
. Then agent 2 accepts x,
agent 3 chooses i = 1 and proposes y = a
(
S,
〈
xi, p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
, agent 1 finds it
optimal to choose y so that agent 2 does not ask for a renegotiation and her
final payoff is x1. Under Lemma 4.2, x1 < p
T,·1
1 and hence agent 1 does not
improve.
We know prove that pT,13 is the only subgame perfect equilibrium payoff
allocation when Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold.
Assume we are in a subgame perfect equilibrium that satisfies Assumption
1 and Assumption 2. We proceed by a series of Claims:
Claim 4.1 Assume x3 < p
T,12
3 . In the subgame that begins when j chooses
z ∈ S, the final payoff allocation is a
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , d3
〉)
.
Proof. Since x3 < p
T,12
3 , agent i can induce q
T−1,j3 by choosing x, knowing
that agent 3 is bound to ask for a renegotiation and hence force BT−1 [3ij].
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Notice that, under the induction hypothesis, agent 3 would get pT−1,·33
(1)
= pT,123
by asking for a renegotiation and x3 by not doing so. In particular, agent i
can assure herself qT−1,j3i .
On the other hand, agent 3 can assure herself a payoff of d3 by vetoing
any proposal (notice also that d3 ≤ p
T−1,·3
3 ).
Hence, agent j can assure herself aj
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , d3
〉)
− ǫj for all ǫj > 0
by proposing z = a
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , d3
〉)
+ (ǫi,−ǫj, ǫ3) for appropriate values of
ǫi > 0 and ǫ3 > 0. Thus, in subgame perfect equilibrium, agent j gets at
least aj
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , d3
〉)
. Since each agent can assure a
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , d3
〉)
,
this is the only possible payoff allocation in subgame perfect equilibrium.
Claim 4.2 Assume x3 ≥ p
T,12
3 . In the subgame that begins when j chooses
z ∈ S, the final payoff allocation is a (S, 〈xi, d3〉).
Proof. Since x3 ≥ p
T,12
3 , agent i can assure herself xi by choosing x, knowing
that agent 3 would not ask for a renegotiation (under Assumption 1 when
x3 = p
T,12
3 ). Notice that, under the induction hypothesis, agent 3 would get
pT−1,·33
(1)
= pT,123 by asking for a renegotiation and x3 by not doing so. On
the other hand, agent 3 can assure herself d3 by vetoing any z. Hence, the
subgame perfect equilibrium payoff for agent j is at most aj (S, 〈xi, d3〉).
Hence, agent j can assure herself aj (S, 〈xi, d3〉) − ǫj for all ǫj > 0 by
proposing z = a (S, 〈xi, d3〉) + (ǫi,−ǫj, ǫ3) for appropriate values of ǫi > 0
and ǫ3 > 0. Thus, in subgame perfect equilibrium, agent j gets at least
aj (S, 〈xi, d3〉). Since each agent can assure a (S, 〈xi, d3〉), this is the only
possible payoff allocation in subgame perfect equilibrium.
Claim 4.3 Assume x3 < p
T,12
3 . In the subgame that begins when agent 3
chooses y ∈ S, the final payoff allocation is pT−1,j3 when T > 1, and p0,12
when T = 1.
Proof. Since x3 < p
T,12
3 , under Claim 4.1, agent i can induce a
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , d3
〉)
by choosing x. If agent i chooses y, then, under the induction hypothesis,
agent j can induce qT−1,j3 by asking for a renegotiation.
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Hence, agent 3 can assure herself a3
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
− ǫ3 for all
ǫ3 > 0 by proposing z = a
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
+(ǫi, ǫj ,−ǫ3) for appropriate
values of ǫi > 0 and ǫj > 0. Thus, in subgame perfect equilibrium, agent 3
gets at least a3
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
.
When T > 1,
a3
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
= a3
(
S,
〈
pT−1,j3i , p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
(5)
= pT−1,j33
and , since each agent k can assure pT−1,j3k , this p
T−1,j3 is the only possible
payoff allocation in subgame perfect equilibrium.
When T = 1,
a3
(
S,
〈
qT−1,j3i , p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
= a3 (S, 〈di, dj〉) = p
0,ij
3 = p
0,12
3
and, since each agent k can assure p0,12k , this p
0,12 is the only possible payoff
allocation in subgame perfect equilibrium.
Claim 4.4 Assume x3 ≥ p
T,12
3 . In the subgame that begins when agent 3
chooses i ∈ argmaxk∈{1,2} a3
(
S,
〈
xk, p
T−1,·kc
kc
〉)
, and the final payoff alloca-
tion is a
(
S,
〈
xi, p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
.
Proof. Since x3 ≥ p
T,12
3 , under Claim 4.2, agent i can induce a (S, 〈xi, d3〉)
by choosing x. If agent i chooses y, then, under the induction hypothesis,
agent j can induce qT−1,j3 by asking for a renegotiation.
Hence, agent 3 can assure herself a3
(
S,
〈
xi, p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
− ǫ3 for all ǫ3 > 0
by proposing z = a
(
S,
〈
xi, p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
+ (ǫi, ǫj ,−ǫ3) for appropriate values of
ǫi > 0 and ǫj > 0. Thus, in subgame perfect equilibrium, agent 3 gets at
least maxk∈{1,2} a3
(
S,
〈
xk, p
T−1,·kc
kc
〉)
. Under Lemma 4.1, this payoff is not
lower than pT,123 . Hence it is neither lower than d3, which would be the final
payoff for agent 3 in case she induces agent i to choose x. Since each agent
can assure a
(
S,
〈
xi, p
T−1,·j
j
〉)
, this is the only possible payoff allocation in
subgame perfect equilibrium.
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Claim 4.5 In the subgame that begins when agent 2 rejects x, the final payoff
for agent 1 is strictly lower than pT,·11 .
Proof. Under the induction hypothesis, the final payoff allocation is qT−1,12
if agent 3 chooses BT−1 [132], and qT−1,23 if agent 3 chooses BT−1 [213].
If T = 1, the final payoff for agent 1 would be d1 < p
T,·1
1 irrespectively of
agent 3’s choice.
If T is odd and T > 1, then pT−1,233
(2)
< pT−1,123 and hence agent 3
would strictly prefer to play BT−1 [132]. The final payoff for agent 1 will
be pT−1,121
(4)
< pT,·11 .
If T is even, pT−1,233
(2)
> pT−1,123 and hence agent 3 would strictly prefer to
play BT−1 [312]. The final payoff for agent 1 will be pT−1,231
(3)
< pT,·11 .
Claim 4.6 If agent 1 proposes some x with x3 < p
T,12
3 , her final payoff will
be strictly lower than pT,·11 .
Proof. If agent 2 rejects, under Claim 4.5 the final payoff for agent 1 is
strictly lower than pT,·11 . If agent 2 accepts, under Claim 4.3, the final payoff
will be pT−1,j3 when T > 1 and p0,12 when T = 1.
Assume first T = 1. Then, the final payoff for agent 1 is d1 < p
T,·1
1 .
Assume now T > 1. Under (1), agent 3 is indifferent on the choice
of i and j. Under Assumption 2, agent 3 would choose i and j so that
pT−1,j31 < p
T−1,i3
1 . Under (2), this implies that the final payoff is p
T−1,13 if T
is odd, and pT−1,23 if T is even. If T is odd, pT−1,131
(4)
< pT,·11 . If T is even,
pT−1,231
(3)
< pT,·11 . In either case, agent 1 will get less than p
T,·1
1 .
Claim 4.7 If agent 1 proposes some x with x3 ≥ p
T,12
3 and a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
<
a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
, the final payoff for agent 1 will be strictly lower than
pT,·11 .
Proof. If agent 2 rejects, under Claim 4.5 the final payoff for agent 1 is
strictly less than pT,·11 . Moreover, the induction hypothesis implies that agent
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2 gets pT−1,·22 , irrespectively of agent 3’s choice. Assume then agent 2 accepts,
under Claim 4.4, the final payoff allocation is a
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
. Moreover,
x2 ≥ p
T−1,·2
2 (otherwise, agent 2 would not accept).
If T is odd, pT−1,·11
(4)
< pT,·11 and hence the result holds.
Assume T is even. We have x2 ≥ p
T−1,·2
2 and x3 ≥ p
T,12 (1)= pT−1,·33 , which
implies x1 ≤ p
T−1,23
1 and hence
a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
≥ a3
(
S,
〈
pT−1,231 , p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
(5)
= pT−1,233
(2)
> pT−1,123
(5)
= a3
(
S,
〈
pT−1,·22 , p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
(x2≥pT−1,·22 )
≥ a3
(
S, x2, p
T−1,·1
1
)
.
which is impossible.
Claim 4.8 The final payoff allocation is pT,13.
Proof. It is enough to prove that each agent k can get at least pT,13k .
Agent 2: Under the induction hypothesis, agent 2 can assure herself
pT−1,·22
(1)
= pT,132 by rejecting any x.
Agent 1: Given any ǫ1 > 0, there exists some ǫ2 > 0 such that x =
pT,12 + (−ǫ1, ǫ2, 0) ∈ S. Assume agent 1 proposes this x. Clearly, x3 ≥ p
T,12
3
and, moreover,
a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
= a3
(
S,
〈
pT,·11 − ǫ1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
> a3
(
S,
〈
pT,·11 , p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
= a3
(
S,
〈
pT,·11 , p
T,13
2
〉)
= pT,·33 = a3
(
S,
〈
pT,231 , p
T,·2
2
〉)
> a3
(
S,
〈
pT,231 , p
T,·2
2 + ǫ2
〉)
= a3
(
S,
〈
pT,231 , x2
〉)
.
If agent 2 rejects x, under the induction hypothesis her final payoff will
be pT−1,·22 . If agent 2 accepts x , under Claim 4.4 the final payoff allocation
will be a
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
. Thus, agent 2 is indifferent between accepting
and rejecting. Under Assumption 1, agent 2 accepts and the final payoff for
agent 1 is x1.
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Hence, agent 1 can assure herself pT,·11 −ǫ1 for all ǫ1 > 0. Thus, in subgame
perfect equilibrium, agent 1 gets at least pT,·11 .
Agent 3: Under Claim 4.6 and Claim 4.7, agent 1 will propose some
x with x3 ≥ p
T,12
3 and a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
≥ a3
(
S,
〈
x2, p
T−1,·1
1
〉)
. Since
pT,123
(1)
= pT−1,·33 , under Lemma 4.2, this implies x1 ≤ p
T,·1
1 . Moreover, under
Claim 4.5, agent 2 will accept it. Under Claim 4.4, the final payoff for agent
3 will be a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
. Since x1 ≤ p
T,·1
1 ,
a3
(
S,
〈
x1, p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
≥ a3
(
S,
〈
pT,·11 , p
T−1,·2
2
〉)
(1)
= a3
(
S,
〈
pT,·11 , p
T,13
2
〉)
(5)
= pT,133 .
Hence, agent 3 gets at least pT,133 .
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